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Abstract - Incumbents' winback actions recently received a growing 
antitrust scrutiny in network industries. These actions refer to 
incumbents’ strategies aimed at regaining, through targeted marketing 
and selective discounts, former customers who switched to a new 
entrant. We analyze the impact of winback actions on competition and 
discuss pros and cons of a temporarily ban on incumbent's side, through 
the so-called 'winback rules'.   
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 1. Introduction 
In several liberalized industries, the major competition concern today 
appears to be not merely that of granting competitors’ entry – which is 
generally assured by asymmetric regulation in network industries - rather 
that of preventing incumbent’s ability to maintain anti-competitively high 
market share, to ‘marginalize’ competitors and/or to inhibit entrant’s ability 
to reach the necessary scale economies to become viable competitors 
(Vickers, 2005). At least in Europe, some recent antitrust decisions on 
unilateral conducts address, among other things, this issue1.  
Growing after entry, rather than just entering seems the main problem in 
many liberalized industries. Incumbent’s exclusionary conducts against as-
efficient rivals could play a role in this case (Whinston, 1990), as the main 
problem is not given by structural barriers to entry, but by the emergence of 
e n d o g e n o u s  b a r r i e r s  t o  g r o w  o r  t o  increase market penetration by new 
entrants.  
In this paper we suggest that the recent phenomenon of winback or poaching 
actions adopted by incumbents, massively observed in network industries 
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000), may constitute a new frontier of 
anticompetitive behaviour adopted by incumbents,  aiming at ‘marginalizing’ 
new entrants.  
Winback actions refer to incumbents’ strategies aimed at contacting a former 
customer who has left for a new entrant, for the purpose of regaining that 
customer back. These strategies apply to post-entry competition and thus are 
clearly distinguished from raising rivals’ costs, predatory actions (predatory 
pricing, retention/matching prices, exclusivity and switch penalties clauses 
upon customers, etc) or any other entry deterrence option (i.e. strategic 
capacity selection) available to the incumbent prior to the time of entry 
(Smith, 2003).  
Generally, winback strategies take the form of incumbent’s marketing calls 
to competitors’ clients promoting selective offers or discount in order to 
                                                 
1 Case T-340/03, France Télécom SA v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II-107;  Commission Decision of 21 May 
2003, COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579 — Deutsche Telekom AG, 2003 O.J. (L 263) 9 , see also Case T-
271/03, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission  (judgment of Apr. 10, 2008); Case COMP/38.784 — Wanadoo 
España v Telefónica.   2 
recover lost customers. These offers are thus selectively tailored to 
competitors’ customers, also on the basis of past information on previous 
clients held by the incumbent, and typically these offers are not 
commercialized to incumbents’ existing customers. 
While it is generally argued that these strategies are merely the result of 
competition to the benefits of customers, some antitrust and regulatory 
authorities in telecommunications have recently considered them as 
anticompetitive conducts. In this  paper, we outline the potential anti-
competitive rationale for winback actions as strategies aimed at blocking off 
post-entry competitors expansion to the critical level which enable the 
entrant to compete on an equal basis against the incumbent. With respect to 
standard entry deterrence strategies, which generally face problems of post-
entry commitment and credible threats by incumbent, we show how blocking 
off competitors’ post-entry expansion could be, in some circumstances, a 
more profitable strategy in the incumbent’s interest, bringing to a higher 
degree of effectiveness. We name the effect produced by winback strategy as 
the holed bucket effect, since entrant’s customers are induced to exit like water 
pouring in a holed bucket, postponing entrant’s ability to cover start up 
costs. 
In particular, we outline the conditions under which (i) incumbent’s winback 
strategy is rational only when exclusionary, i.e. only if the incumbent expects 
that an entrant is likely to be deterred from entry or from expanding its 
capacity after entry as a result, (ii) a ban on incumbent’s winback may 
actually increase consumers welfare, even if that encourages short-term 
inefficient entry.  
The  paper proceeds as follows. Section 2  outlines the literature and 
motivation to whom the paper refers to. Section 3 surveys some recent cases 
in selected countries concerning winback strategies enacted by an incumbent 
operator in network industries. Section 4, recalls the results of the Gelman 
and Salop (1983) model on post/entry competition with zero entry cost. 
Section 5 shows how entry costs may affect incentives to accommodate by 
the incumbent. Section 6 outlines how, taking entry has granted, the 
incumbent has strong incentives to accommodate entry followed by winback 
strategies, then we show the welfare implications of a ban on winback 
policies. Section 7 further elaborates some motivation surrounding the 
behavioural assumption on entrant’s strategy. Sections 8 and 9 compare the   3 
exclusionary effect generated by winback with those associated to traditional 
foreclosure strategies. Section 10 draws the main conclusions.  
 
2. Literature and Motivation 
The scholarly wide literature on entry deterrence, predation, raising rivals’ 
costs and so on has mainly focused on the impact of incumbent’s pre-entry 
deterrence strategy on competitors’ incentives to enter the monopolistic 
market (Wilson, 1992; Rey and Tirole, 2007). From early theories on entry 
deterrence on (Spence, 1977; Salop and Scheffman, 1983; Dixit, 1980; 
Scherer, 1980), the attention has been most entirely devoted to analyze the 
incumbent’s ability to make a credible threat not to accommodate after entry 
occurred.  
Even if inducement of exit is taxonomically identical to entry deterrence 
(Tirole, 1988), only few models have dealt with analytical frameworks in 
which entry is taken as granted and the focus is on incumbent’s strategies to 
affect competitors’ subsequent behaviour. If we look at the realm of 
competition policies, especially in network industries, exclusionary strategies 
are for the most adopted against new entrants that have already established 
their business and served a significant group of customers. Especially in 
network industries, entry is somehow granted by the establishment of rights 
to access to essential facilities and by a regulatory environment which 
inhibits incumbents to freely set prices or suddenly change their rate card.  
Under this perspective, it seems interesting to investigate post-entry 
exclusionary strategies held by dominant firm in order to ‘freeze’ competitors 
markets shares. The distinguishing feature of a winback strategy with 
respect to standard exclusionary practices is that it is applied to (a portion of) 
competitors’ customers rather than to incumbent’s customers. In a sense, 
winback strategies are a mirror image of standard exclusionary practices 
such as exclusivity or retention strategies: while the latter imply a policy of 
rebates and discounts made by the incumbent towards his own customers to 
retain them from switching towards competitors, the former are based on 
rebates and discounts made by the incumbent towards competitors’ 
customers in order to induce them to switch and come back to the 
incumbent’s list.    4 
Thus winback strategies are a form of selective price discrimination towards 
competitors’ customers. Typically incumbent’s winback offers are tailored to 
former customers who left for a new entrant thanks to incumbent’s 
knowledge and ‘memory’ of those customers’ profile. To simplicity’s sake we 
do not consider explicitly this competitive advantage generated by private 
information on consumers’ profile  andcoming to the incumbent due to his 
previous monopolistic position before entry. We also neglect the role played 
by switching costs in affecting winback strategies. 
Our motivation is to show how, from a theoretical point of view, there seems 
not being any compelling reason to evaluate winback strategies in a distinct 
way with respect to any other raising rivals’ cost strategies whose ultimate 
effect is that of generating inefficient exclusion.  Of course, the antitrust 
evaluation of the above practices may differ among countries – and actually it 
differs between US and EU antitrust policies – but  we argue that whenever 
an antitrust authority deems as anticompetitive exclusionary strategies like 
network exclusivity clauses, fidelity or target rebates, selective price 
undercutting or discounts, and so on, it has to include also winback in its 
warning list.  
The approaches followed by antitrust agencies in the treatment of 
incumbent’s winback actions fall into two well-known warring camps  of the 
‘Chicagoan School skeptics’ and of the ‘Post-Chicagoan activists’ 
(Hovenkamp, 1994).  
The  Chicagoan may believe that winback strategies are simply pro-
competitive actions given that when firms cut prices they should not take 
onto account the effect on competitors’ profits but only the hypothetical 
harm to customers (thus considering as pro-competitive any cut price as long 
as it is over above the costs threshold for predatory abuse) (Posner, 1976; 
Bork, 1978; Easterbrook, 1984). Since entry has already occurred and some 
customers in fact have already left the incumbent, winback strategies, even if 
carried on by incumbent firms, are merely the effect of competition on the 
merits. Customers will re-orient their choices towards (what they perceive to 
be) the best seller and competition will be alive even if competitors may not. 
Moreover, since winback strategies should be associated to some economic 
advantage passed on customers in order to induce them to switch back, 
consumers welfare is about to be enhanced. Finally, if new entrants are 
driven from the market as a consequence of winback strategies that means   5 
that they were somehow inefficient, i.e unable to match the incumbent 
winback offers to retain their own customers.  
On the other hand, the Post-Chicagoan may tend to consider winback 
strategies as a sort of selective price undercutting. Since they believe that 
even above-cost price undercutting or selective discounts may harm 
competition as well as final customers by inhibiting long-term efficient entry, 
also winback strategies should consequently receive an antitrust scrutiny. In 
their view, dominance implies a short-term competitive advantage by 
incumbent firm. Thus whenever an entrant as efficient as the incumbent 
cannot effectively replicate the discount policies adopted by incumbents (as 
long as a critical threshold is reached in terms of capacity, minimum scale or 
minimum number of subscribers when switching costs or network effects are 
present) exclusionary practices that raise rivals’ cost up to the point to 
discourage entry or to induce exit should sanctioned by antitrust authorities. 
To our knowledge, ours is the first paper attempting to analyze the economic 
rationale and effect of winback strategies. Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) 
analyze a model of consumer poatching, but their framework refers to a 
symmetric duopolistic market structure, whereas we focus on asymmetric 
market structure characterized by a dominant firm and by new entrant facing 
some fixed levek of entry costs.  
 
 
2. Winback actions under antitrust scrutiny in selected 
countries 
In recent years a growing number of winback cases have been filed to 
antitrust and regulatory authorities. As with many other exclusionary 
practices, the antitrust consideration of winback strategies is important 
because “it affects the extent to which dominant firms may defend themselves 
against competition rather than act to consolidate or even increase their 
dominance in the market2.  
  
                                                 
2 See Jones and Sufrin (2001) p. 343. The point raised here for winback strategies is thus strictly related to 
that raised by selective discounting or price undercutting.    6 
2.1 The rise and fall of winback rules in Canada 
The Canadian Radio-Television and Telecomunications Commission has been 
one of the first authorities delivering decisions on the matter limiting 
incumbent’s ability to recover lost customers through win-back discounts. 
Local exchange winback restrictions were first imposed on the ILECs in a 
letter decision3 stating, among other things, that “an ILEC is not to attempt to 
win back a customer for a period of three months after that customer's service has been 
completely transferred to another local service provider, with one exception: ILECs 
should be allowed to win back customers who call to advise them that they intend to 
change local service provider”.  
The Commission stated that without such guidelines, ILECs would 
potentially be able to win back customers even before local service was 
effectively transferred to a CLEC because ILECs control and have access to 
customer specific information. Subsequently, in another letter decision4, the 
Commission imposed winback rules on incumbent cable operators in respect 
of customers who have chosen to subscribe to the services of a competing 
broadcast distribution undertaking. Winback activities were defined as “the 
offering to customers of discounts, free services or other inducements in order to 
convince those customers not to change service providers or to revert back to their 
original service provider”.  
The Commission then imposed5 winback restrictions on high-speed (cable 
modem) Internet access services. In that circumstance, the Commission noted 
that since the winback rules were first applied in 1998, there had been an 
increase in the marketing of bundled service offerings by incumbent operator. 
In this regard, the Commission noted that an attempt by an ILEC to sell a 
bundle that included optional local services to a lost residential primary 
exchange customer would generally have constituted a winback activity for 
primary exchange service since its acceptance would generally mean that the 
customer, for technical reasons, would have been obliged to switch back to 
the ILEC's primary exchange service.  
                                                 
3 Commission Decision regarding CRTC Interconnection Steering Committee dispute on competitive 
winback guidelines, dated 16 April 1998. 
4 CISC dispute – Rules regarding communication between the customer and the broadcast distribution 
undertaking, dated 1 April 1999. 
5 Order CRTC 2001-92, Terms and rates approved for large cable carriers' higher speed access service – 
Follow-up to Order CRTC 2000-789, dated 1 February 2001   7 
The Commission subsequently interpreted and expanded the winback 
restrictions in a number of decisions to addressed specific issues and 
circumstances. The Telecom Decision CRTC 2006-15 (6 April 2006) declares 
that “an ILEC is not to attempt to win back a business customer with respect to 
primary exchange service or local] VoIP service, and in the case of a residential 
customer of local exchange service), with respect to any service, for a period 
commencing at the time of the local service request and terminating three months after 
that customer's primary local exchange service or local VoIP service has been 
completely transferred to another local service provider, with one exception: ILECs 
should be allowed to win back customers who call to advise them that they intend to 
change local service provider”.  
At the end of 2007 CRTC cancelled6 winback rules following the argument 
that, after ten years, there was enough competition in affected relevant 
markets to end those marketing restrictions. 
 
2.2 The treatment of incumbent’s winback strategies in the US 
The US federal approach towards winback may certainly defined as 
Chicagoan, even if at the origins it applied a rule against winback. The Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) delivered a decision, in 1998, concerning 
the use of Consumer proprietary network information (CPNI) for marketing 
purposes7.  
The Commission adopted a regulation aimed at preventing 
telecommunications carriers from using, without customer approval, CPNI to: 
(1) market customer premises equipment ("CPE") or information services 
(such as call answering, voice mail, or Internet access services); (2) identify or 
track customers that call competitors; and (3) regain the business of 
customers who have switched to another carrier (winback).  
As a consequence, the use of CPNI for winback actions was prohibited not 
only for incumbents but for all carriers. In a later review of the CPNI order, 
                                                 
6 Telecom Decision CRTC 2007-97 
7   In particular, CPNI refers to (A) information that relates to the quantity, technical configuration, type, 
destination, and amount of use of a telecommunications service subscribed to by any customer of a 
telecommunications carrier, and that is made available to the carrier by the customer solely by virtue of the 
customer-carrier relationship; and  ￿   (B) information contained in the bills pertaining to telephone 
exchange service or telephone toll service received by a customer of a carrier. ￿Except that such term does 
not include subscriber list information.   8 
the Commission removed the winback prohibition, while concluding that a 
carrier’s use of information regarding a customer’s decision to switch carriers 
derived from its wholesale operations to retain the customer would violate the 
law prohibitions.  
In 1999, the Commission stated that that “all carriers should be able to use CPNI 
to engage in winback marketing campaigns to target valued former customers that 
have switched to other carriers.  After reviewing the fuller record on this issue 
developed on reconsideration, we are persuaded that winback campaigns […]in most 
instances facilitate and foster competition among carriers, benefiting customers 
without unduly impinging upon their privacy”. Moreover, “winback restrictions may 
deprive customers of the benefits of a competitive market.  Winback facilitates direct 
competition on price and other terms, for example, by encouraging carriers to "out 
bid" each other for a customer's business, enabling the customer to select the carrier 
that best suits the customer's needs. […], once a customer is no longer obtaining 
service from the ILEC, the ILEC must compete with the new service provider to 
obtain the customer's business. We believe that such competition is in the best interest 
of the customer and see no reason to prohibit ILECs from taking part in this practice. 
[…]Because winback campaigns can promote competition and result in lower prices 
to consumers, we will not condemn such practices absent a showing that they are truly 
predatory.  Thus, we conclude that the statute permits a carrier evaluating whether to 
launch a winback campaign to use CPNI to target valued former customers who have 
switched service providers.”.  
Beside, this FCC decision, however, a growing number of US states are 
considering to adopt or have already adopted rules governing 
winback/retention activities8 including Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, 
North Carolina, and South Carolina.  
In 2001 a group of new entrants  submitted a petition to the Public Utility 
Commission of Texas in telecommunications alleging that marketing 
practices by ILECs related to special “winback”. In 2004, the Kansas 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Petition of the Southwest Competitive Telephone Association, IP Communications Corp., XO 
Texas, Inc., ASCENT, CompTel, Sage Telecom, Inc., Z-Tel Communications, and Birch Telecom of Texas, 
LLP to Amend PUC Substantive Rule 26.226, Order Denying Petition for Rulemaking and Initiating 
Investigation, Project No. 24597, Public Utility Commission of Texas (Nov., 8, 2001); Investigation of 
Winback/Retention Offers by Chapter 58 Electing Companies, Project No. 24948, Public Utility 
Commission of Texas; In the Matter of the Commission’s Discussion of Qwest Corporation’s WinBack 
Promotional Filing, Docket No. N2002.4.44 (May 8, 2002 vote to file a complaint in district court).  A 
variety of other states are considering or have adopted rules governing winback/retention activities 
including Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, North Carolina, and South Carolina.   9 
Corporation Commission enforced its "winback" prohibitions, forbidding the 
incumbent, SBC, from attempting to "winback" customers migrating to other 
carriers for 30 days after the switch has occurred.  
 
2.3 The scrutiny of winback strategies under European antitrust 
authorities 
In Europe several national antitrust authorities have started investigations 
concerning winback activities, thus envisaging what we have defined as a post-
Chicagoan approach at least by recognising that winback actions by incumbent 
could, under given conditions, perform anticompetitive practices.  
In the UK two different regulatory bodies have been recently asked to take a 
decision regarding the anti-competitive impact of incumbent’s winback 
actions. The first case concerns the electricity sector. The energy regulator, 
Ofgem, which has concurrent power with the competition authority OFT to 
apply the Competition Act, received in 2003 a complaint of alleged abuse of 
dominant position by the incumbent London Electricity (LE). The alleged 
abuse of dominance regarded the terms of the winback offered proposed to 
competitors’ customers by LE: “consumers switching back to LE would 
receive a voucher worth £25 after four months and another voucher worth a 
further £50 after nine months. Although the consumer was entitled to switch 
at any time, he would have to remain with LE for 13 months in order to 
benefit from the full £75” (Ofgem, 2003). Abuse of dominance was alleged on 
two different grounds. First, the economic incentive to switch back to LE was 
significantly greater than any other discount affordable by competitors to 
new customers. Secondly, customers switching back to LE were asked to 
remain with LE for 13 months. LE’s winback discriminated in terms of 
offering different prices to different customer groups: in particular Ofgem 
retained that an offer targeted towards LE’s competitors’ customers may have 
had an anti-competitive effect on LE’s competitors. The Authority first used 
cost data already available and determined that the offer price was below cost. 
Then, it initiated an investigation to assess the effect of the offer on 
competition, by analyzing: “how many customers had been contacted with the 
aim of making the offer; how many had taken up the offer; and the duration of 
the offer” (Ofgem, 2003). The investigation offer was limited in terms of the 
number of customers contacted by LE, the number of customers taking up the 
offer and the length of time for which the offer was made to customers. The   10  
circumstance that there was a quite limited take up of the offer meant that the 
price discrimination between former LE customers who had switched and LE 
customers who had not switched did not have an anti-competitive effect.  
The second case in the United Kingdom was opened in 2004 and refers to the 
telecommunication sector. Ofcom, the communications regulator, received a 
complain by the new entrant Tele2 against the incumbent British Telecom 
(BT) regarding the winback calls made by BT to a Tele2 CPS customer. 
Tele2 in particular alleged those calls to be a breach of BT's obligations under 
General Condition 1.2 of the Communications Act 2003, which “prohibits the 
use of certain information provided in the context of negotiating Network 
Access and/or interconnection arrangements for purposes other than for 
which the information was supplied” (Ofcom, 2004). In particular, Tele2 
alleged that a call made by BT to one of Tele2's existing customers was an 
anti-competitive attempt by BT to winback the customer. However, the 
investigation held by Ofcom confirmed that  BT did not used information 
from other communications providers in order to identify and contact 
customers for winback purposes. 
In Italy, in 2006, the Court of Appeal in Milan decided in favour of the 
plaintiff Fastweb S.p.A against dominant’s winbacks (Telecom Italia S.p.A) in 
the Italian telecommunication market for fixed lines. Upholding the 
application for an interim remedy brought by the applicant against the 
defendant, the Court ordered the incumbent not to continue in the forms of 
abusive conduct considered in the judgment, and in particular comprising the 
use of information on former customers by its commercial divisions for 
targeted winback activities, such activities conducted particularly through the 
use of repeated telephone calls to former customers who have moved over to 
Fastweb; the use of information supplied by former customers to the new 
operator at the time of the former clients' termination of their then-current 
contracts, with a request for number portability; the incentive scheme 
contracted upon its sales network through increased commissions and other 
forms of incentives selectively connected exclusively with the winning back of 
Fastweb customers; the offering of services upon favourable terms selectively 
reserved to Fastweb's current customers to persuade them to return to 
Telecom; and denigratory activities to Fastweb's harm.  The Court defined 
the amount of EUR 500.00 that Telecom Italia shall pay to Fastweb for each 
breach or failure to comply that is subsequently identified in the performance 
of the prohibition.   11  
In 2007 the Italian Antitrust Authority opened an investigation alleging 
abuse of dominance by the incumbent operator in the telecommunication 
sector (Telecom Italia) through winback and retention strategies. The 
Authority accepted commitments by Telecom Italia not to engage in winback 
for a period of 4 months towards former customers, unless the initiative is 
taken by them; to provide toan independent society the list of customers to be 
contacted in roder to grant a full separation between the retail and the 
network division. 
In France, in 2003 Neuf Telecom, recovered €7 million in damages from 
France Telecom as compensation decided by the the Paris Court for revenues 
lost as a result of France Telecom’s anti-competitive practices to win-back 
customers lost to the new entrant operator in telecommunication sector. In 
Spain in 2004 the Servicio de Defensa de la Competencia has sanctioned 
Telefonica for its winback strategies against Astel. In the Netherlands, 
Pretium Telecom, a provider of Carrier (pre-)select telephone services, filed a 
complaint with the Dutch Competition Authority (“NMa”) for winback as 
abuse of a dominant position by Dutch telecom incumbent KPN. In Sweden, 
in 2005, the Competition Authority has imposed a sanction for its winback 
actions against. In Greece, in 2007, the National Competition Authority has 
delivered a decision against the incumbent operator in telecommunication 
services OTE for its winback actions.  
The decisions above vary in their meaning and applications, and fail, in our 
view, in clarifying the economic rationale for incumbent’s winback strategies 
and the real meaning of their anticompetitive nature. In the next sections we 
provide a simple modelling of anticompetitive winback strategies. 
 
4. A Model of Post-Entry Competition: Baseline  
In this section we illustrate a simple model of post-entry competition without 
on the basis of Gelman and Salop (1983)9. This model is the baseline we will 
use in order to analyze the conditions under which incumbent’s winback 
actions turn to be anti-competitive. 
                                                 
9 We refer here to a reduced form as in Shy (1995).   12  
 Let us consider a market in which a leader firm I sells the quantity qI on the 
market and a follower firm E covers the residual demand on the market 
selling a quantity  qE. To the sake of simplicity let us assume that: 
-  firms have identical cost structure and production costs equal to zero; 
-  the incumbent firm has unlimited capacity and both the firms produce 
an homogenous good with a demand  curve given by  p = 100 –Q 
where Q=( qI+ qE); 
-  all consumers prefer the less expensive demand; moreover consumers 
prefer the incumbent’s  brand name when prices are matched.  
Let pI and pE respectively be prices charged by the leader and the follower 
on the market, and let k be the capacity invested by E (which is assumed as a 
proxy of the group of customers served), with k° being the observable entry’s 
capacity. The quantities demanded on the market are: 
qI =
100− pI             if  p
I ≤ p
E  









   qE =
k            if  p
E < p
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Market demand is shared between the leader and the follower according to 
the value of the prices.  
Let us define k* as the value of entrant’s capacity-market share which induces 
a matching price strategy by the incumbent. In order to derive the value of 
k* we have to compare the incumbent profit in the case of ‘undercutting’ or 
price undercutting  
I
U Π  with the profit level 
I
A Π  the one associated with the 
accommodation strategy. If the accommodation strategy is that chosen by 
the incumbent firm it must be that: 
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As we can see, the incumbent profitability decrease as the Entrant’s capacity 
or market share k increases,   0 / < Π dk d
I
A .  
Given these values we define the market share k* of the entrant which is 
compatible with an accommodation strategy upon entry by the incumbent as  
the value which equalizes 
I
U Π  and  
I
A Π . We assume that the value of k* is 









Figure 1 - (Shy, 1995) 
Now let us consider the competitor’s profit function which is a linear function 
of market share (capacity) k: 
 (3)     k p
E E = Π  
Thus we have the following three stages game structure. 
1.  At t=0, the entrants sets prices and starting capacity (market share) 
k=k°; 
2.  After entry the incumbent observes k° and decides whether 
accommodate undercutting; 
When the accommodating equilibrium in the post-entry scenario strictly 
dominates the undercutting price equilibrium as long as the competitor 
commits not to enter with a market share greater than k*. When k°>k* the 
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market equilibrium will be characterized by a matching price  at the 
competitive price pE. Then we have the following proposition (Gellman and 
Salop, 1983)10: 
Proposition 1 
In the game below there exists a sufficiently limited capacity level k and a price pE set 













Given the agents’ payoff, there is a critical threshold k* which assigns to 
entrant a payoff Π
E = p
Ek greater than that associated to price matching 
Π
E = 0.  Thus a post-entry scenario with at most k* capacity and 
accomodation is sub-game perfect equilibrium. 
, 
                                                 
10 See also Shy (1995)which the reduced model form is derived.  
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Proposition 1 is very helpful in explaining why entry could be observed 
without price undercutting by incumbent operators in many industries. 
However it doesn’t go further in explaining the nature and dynamics of post-
entry competition. In the next section we extend the above model by 
assuming that entrant has to sustain some fixed entry cost. 
4. An Extension: Post-Entry Competition with Entry 
Costs 
Let us now extend the previous model by assuming that: 
-  the incumbent firm has unlimited capacity, while the entrant firm has 
to sustain some start up costs indicated by h>0, after this sunk cost has 
been recouped the follower can compete on an equal basis against the 
leader, given that both the firms produce an homogenous good with a 
demand  curve given by  p = 100 –Q where Q=( qI+ qE); 
-  all consumers prefer the less expensive demand; moreover consumers 
prefer the incumbent’s  brand name till the follower’s brand has 
reached  a valuable market reputation (here associated with a given 
market share, k ).  
Let pI and pE respectively be prices charged by the leader and the follower 
on the market, and let k be the capacity invested by E (which is assumed as a 
proxy of the group of customers served), with k° being the observable entry’s 
capacity and k  be the minimum capacity needed in order to replicate 
incumbent’s choices and challenge on an equal basis his leadership.  
We assume that   k k ≤ °  and  * k k ≤ ° , where k* is the value at which the 
incumbent firm decides whether or not to accommodate entry (see below). 
We assume that while k° and k* are common knowledge, k  is E’s private 
information upon entry, which will be revealed ex-post. The quantities 
demanded on the market are now:   16  
qI =
100−pI             if  p
I ≤ p
E and   k≤k   
100−k−pI      if  p
I > p
E and   k≤k 
α(100−p
E)      if   p
I = p
E and   k>k 
0                        if   p
I > p














   qE=
k                           if  p
E < p
I   and   k≤k 
(1−α)(100−p
E)  if  p
E = p
I   and   k>k 
100−p
E               if  p
E < p
I   and   k>k 
0                           if   p
E ≥ p














Market demand is shared between the leader and the follower according to 
the value of the prices as well as to the follower’s scale k. When the follower 
has reached just a small scale  k k < °  (which corresponds to the associated 
market share) then the incumbent has full incentives to accommodate and to 
let the follower cover a quota  k° of the total market11 at a price pE while firm 
I will cover the residual demand at the monopolistic price pI.  
This equilibrium holds as a sub-game perfect equilibrium only if k° lower 
than  k* defined as above as the value of entrant’s capacity-market share 
which induces a matching price strategy by the incumbent.  
Now let us consider the competitor’s profit function:  
(3b)     Π
E = p
Ek −h, with dΠ
E /dh < 0 and dΠ
E /dk > 0.  
Since we have assumed that k° < k , for the competitor to survive in the 
market and to compete on an equal basis against the incumbent firm, she 
must increase the entry’s market share k° reaching at least a market share of 




where h>0 is the entry fixed cost, k  being E’s private information to be 
revealed only after accomodation.  
Thus we have the following three stages game structure: 
                                                 
11 We assume that    ) 100 )( 1 (
E p k − − < ° α .   17  
1.  At t=0, the entrants sets prices and the starting capacity (market 
share) k=k°; 
2.  After entry the incumbent observes k° and decides whether 
accommodate or undercutting; 
3.  At t=1, if the incumbent has accommodated, then the entrant reveals 
his private information on the value of k , i.e. the expansion or not of 
the starting capacity k°. 
4.  At t=2 if the entrant has decided to expand, then the incumbent has to 
decide whether to accommodate (which means reducing to a  his 
market share) or not.  
Let us assume first that the entrant is able to credibly commit not to increase 
the starting capacity k° (and market share) after entry has occurred, i.e. to 
send a credible signal to the incumbent on maintaining a capacity k°. 
 In this case, the game lasts just one period. At t=0, the entrants sets prices 
p
E < p
Iand starting capacity (market share) k=k° and after entry has 
occurred the incumbent observes k° and decides whether accommodate or 
undercutting  p
I = p
E. If he undercuts then the entrants is induced to exit. If 
the incumbent accommodates then the entrant will serve k° customers  at a 
price  p
E < p
I, while the residual demand q
I =100−k−p
I i s  s e r v e d  b y  t h e  
incumbent at price  p
I.  
The above is exactly the outcome of the Gelman and Salop (1983) model, 
who assume a credible commitment on entrant’s side. The following figure 
























I(100− k − p
I), then the unique equilibrium is 
one in which the incumbent accommodates since by assumption k°<k*. Thus 
if h=0 we have here one Nash equilibrium in accommodating strategy.  
 
Proposition 2 
When entry fixed costs are zero, the above game has a unique NE in accommodating 









It is trivial to see how when h=0, k = k° ≤ k *, then Proposition 1 applies. 
, 
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t=2   19  
However when h>0, the entrant maintains strong incentives to increase her 
capacity after entry in order to reach the long-term capacity that it is needed 
in order to compete on an equal basis against the incumbent.  
Let us define as g as the probability that I attributes to E’s decision to extend 
her capacity to the level k , g(k )= prob k ≥ k  { }, withg ∈[0,1]. Then we have 
the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3 
After E’s entry occurred, if h>0 andf g=g(k ) is sufficiently high the above game will 
have a unique Nash Equilibrium associated with I’s price undercutting.  
 
Proof 
We can actually imagine five different equilibria in the game depicted in 
figure 3 according to the assumptions made on the level k and on asymmetric 
information on E’s capacity and I’s belief over g: 
a.  blockaded entry when h>0, and  when g(k ) is high and observable 
by I with profit levels Π M
I = p
I (100 − p
I );   ΠO
E = 0; 
b.  entry with price undercutting when h>0 and when g(k ) is high and 
not observable by I with profit levels Π
I = p
E(100 − p
E);   Π
E =− h; 
c.  entry with accommodating strategy when h=0 or when g(k ) is very 






;   Π
E = p
Ek −h; 
d.  entry with accommodating strategy and expansion by E to k=k  
when h>0 and g(k ) is very low and observable by E or E’s entry at 








,   20  
Proposition 3 clearly shows that when there are entry costs, the entrant’s 
commitment not to expand capacity after entry is far to be credible. The 
assumption of positive entry costs thus modifies the result of Gelman and 
Salop (1983), given that the incumbent maintains in this context strong 
incentives not to accommodate entry and thus to choose price undercutting. 
As a consequence, the circumstance that k<k* is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition to induce accommodation by I. What is relevant here is 
the probability that the entrant may reach a capacity level equal to k , once 
entry has occurred. Thus the presence of entry fixed costs negatively affects 
the credibility of entrant’s commitment.  
On the other hand, the post-entry price undercutting equilibrium in 
proposition 3 derives however from the assumption that we are taking entry 
has granted, i.e. that I’s belief on E’s decision is not observable by the entrant 
(section 7 will discuss this assumption). If we relax this assumption and 
consider g(k ) were observable by I before entry we should expect no entry at 
all.  
Summing up, with full information and rational agents, we should expect two 
alternative equilibria: (i) no entry or (ii) if entry is actually observed, we 
should expect a case in which entry occurs immediately at the level 
k°=k bringing to duopolistic market sharing. As a consequence, the 
circumstance in which we observe markets with entry costs characterized by 
accommodation by I coupled with entrant’s inability to expand her capacity 
should be quite difficult to understand in our framework as the outcome of 
rational agents in a strategic game with full information and common 
knowledge. Nonetheless this is precisely what we observe in many post-
liberalized network industries at least in Europe. How we can thus conciliate 
the fact of observing entry by rational agent characterized by post-entry 
‘blockaded expansion’ in her capacity? Next section tries to address this 
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5. Post-Entry Competition with Entry Costs and 
Winback Strategies 
In this section we extend the above framework by introducing two further 
assumptions: 
(i)  we extend the strategy toolkit of the incumbent, conceding that the 
incumbent may adopt, after E’s choice to expand capacity over k°,  
some ex-post strategy (i.e. winback) in order to block the expansion 
of the entrant towards the break-even value k ; 
(ii)  we assume that entrantseither cannot anticipate at t=0 incumbent 
post-entry decisions to block the entrants’ expansion towards the 
break-even value k or deem winback being an exclusionary conduct, 
forbidden by antitrust law (section 6 discusses this assumption); 
In particular we analyze here the effect of winback strategies as exclusionary 
practice. A winback strategy is here defined as follows. 
Definition 1 - A winback is a strategy enacted by the dominant firm to regain 
former customers, i.e. customers who already have switched to and are receiving 
service from another competitor. 
In fact,  incumbent’s winback is a strategy of selective price discrimination 
towards competitors’ customers, implemented by a policy of discounts, 
rebates, promotional prices and so on. As a consequence for a winback 
strategy to be implemented we should assume that in some way the 
incumbent knows the profile of the customers to be regained. The 
distinguishing feature of a winback strategy is that it is applied only towards 
the competitors’ customers and it is not extended to the incumbent’s 
customers, while standard exclusionary strategies generally imply a policy of 
rebates and discounts made by the incumbent towards his own customers to 
retain them from switching towards competitors. 
In order to outline the emergence and the economic rationale for winback 
strategies by an incumbent operator we should add another stage (t=3) in 
our previous game structure. That means that at t=3, given that the entrant 
has revealed her decision at t=2 to expand the capacity towards k = k , the 
incumbent has to decide whether to accommodate or adopt a winback 
strategy.    22  
Here, the adoption of a winback strategy requires the incumbent to apply 
selective  price undercutting or discounts to regain the proportion of 
competitor’s customers which is deemed to be decisive in order for the 
entrant to reach a capacity k = k . The incumbent’s payoff associated with a 
‘successful’ winback strategy is then given by the following equation: 






I(100− k − p
I ) is the payoff coming form the actual residual demand 
served by the incumbent at t=3, while the component  p
Eφ(k −k°) identifies 
the additional returns to the incumbent coming from winning back the 
φ(k −k°) group of customers, with 0 < φ ≤1 at the matching price 
undercutting the entrant’s price  p
E.  
We name the  successful incumbents winback policy on regaining φ(k −k°) 
customers as the holed bucket effect: when winback policy is at stake, entrant’s 
customers pour like water in a holed bucket. As long as winback strategies 
inhibit the entrant to stably reach and exceed the critical threshold k = k , the 
entrant cannot replicate on an equal basis the incumbent policy.  
Under this assumption the entrant’s profit are given by: 
(6)   Π
E = p
E[k −φ(k − k°)]−h 
Thus we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4 – winback as raising rivals’ cost strategy 
Under incumbent’s winback strategy the entrant’s critical threshold to 
compete against winback is endogenously put forward with respect to the ex-
ante level  k k = .  
 
Proof. 
From (3), (4), (5) and (6) it derives that the ex-post entrant critical threshold 
to compete on an equal basis against the incumbent depends on the winback 
rate and is given by:   23  
(7)     ) ( ö ° − + = k k k k φ  
 
, 
Corollary 1– exclusionary effect of a winback strategy 
A successful winback strategy implies the adoption of a rate of regainφ ö such 
that  k k ö ) ö ( < φ  is satisfied. 
 
The above corollary clearly outlines that for a winback strategy to produce 
anticompetitive effects, it is not sufficient that the incumbent is just regaining 
some customers back, rather it must be that the rate of regaining has a 
dimension large enough to substantially block off competitor’s expansion. 
 
Proposition 5. Winback as a rational choice   
A winback strategy  ) ( ö ° −k k φ  is rational only when  k k ö ) ö ( < φ is satisfied. 
Proof.  
Suppose not. Then, if  k k ö ) ö ( ≥ φ , that means that the competitor has unlimited 
capacity to expand her market share at the price determined. In other words, 
the competitor is able to immediately match every winback strategy with the 
result that the incumbent’s payoff will be rapidly equal to that of market 






S p p Π < Π < − = Π ) 100 ( α  which is lower that the 
undercutting price strategy upon entry. Since by our assumption the 
undercutting strategy is available just after entry in t=0, it would be 
irrational for the incumbent to select a strategy to obtain 
I
S Π when another 
strategy brining to 
I
U Π was available in the first instance. 
, 
 
holed bucket effect   24  
Corollary 2 
From proposition 3, 4 and 5 it derives that a winback strategy is an incumbent’s 
rational choice only when it produces exclusionary effects on competitors. 
The above corollary implies that when winback is not effective it would be 
simply irrational for an incumbent to adopt it, given that it would produce a 
continuous rebate on market prices. If the entrant were able to match any 
price proposed by the incumbent through winback actions, any winback 
would simply decrease the price of entrant’s customers, attracting new 
customers towards the entrant and thus rapidly decreasing market price in a 
contagious way. If entrants match any discount proposed as a winback 
strategy, incumbent’s price cuts no longer produce the ‘holed bucket effect’ as 
they would otherwise. As a consequence, when winback strategies result to 
be ineffective to generate exclusion they would never be adopted by a 
rational incumbent.   
We are now ready to analyze the three stages game of post-entry 
competition when winback strategies are in place. If at t=2, the competitor 
has expanded her capacity so as to reach k = k , at t=3 the incumbent will 
react either accommodating or enacting winback strategies. When the 
conditions for a successful winback  ˆ  φ (k −k°) are satisfied, winback strategy 
will be chosen if the payoffs associated to successful winback (thus implying 
k < k ) are greater than that associated to duopolistic market sharing: 
(8)   ΠW
I = p






Since the above always holds by definition12, then at t=3 winback is a 
dominant strategy in the subgame.  
In order to analyze whether the winback strategy is a perfect subgame NE, 
we should move from t=3 to post-entry at t=0 and consider the expected 
value of the payoff under the probability g of entrant choosing to expand 
post-entry market share to  k k = .  
 
 
                                                 
12 It is sufficient to show that when  k k = , by assumption  E I p p = and thus 
) 100 ( ) 100 (

















In the above figure, payoffs are defined as follows:  = Π
I
M pre-entry 
monopolistic profits;  = Π
I
U post-entry undercutting monopolistic profits; 
= Π
I
A post-entry accommodating profits;   = Π
I
W winback profits;  = Π
I
C post-






I ≥0.  
Let us define  g ö as the value according to which 





I(100− k − p
I)+ p
Eφ(k − k°). Then we have the following 
proposition. 
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Proposition 7. Winback as a Nash  equilibrium in the post-entry game 
For a sufficient high probability  g g ö ≥  of entrant choosing to expand post-
entry market share to  k k = , the winback decision  ) ( ö ° −k k φ is a dominant 
strategy in the post-entry game. 
 
Proof. 
From the game structure in figure 5 it is easy to show by backward induction 
(and recalling the assumption on E’s belief about the illegitimate adoption of 
winback by incumbent) that, since g ö i s  s u c h  t h a t  
) ( ) 100 (  
4
100
) ö 1 (
2
° − + − − ≤
−
− k k p p k p
k
g
E I I φ  then winback strategy t=3 
dominates the accommodate strategy at t=2 and post-entry price 
undercutting after t=0. 
, 
Proposition 6 outlines that in a post-entry game, when there are entry fixed 
costs and when a successful winback is ex-post possible for the incumbent, 
the rational behaviour by an incumbent firm is always that of accommodating 
first entry and then eventually adopt winback strategy, since for any value of 
capacity chosen by the entrant the associated payoff for the incumbent are 
always greater under initial accomodation than that those associated to price 
undercutting upon entry. 
This is a remarkable conclusion since it shows that an incumbent may have 
strong incentives to accommodate entry having future anti-competitive 
purposes to exclude competitors and/or to maintain a monopolistic or 
leadership position on the market. Thus observing entry in market 
characterized by monopolistic or dominant position should not be 
automatically deemed as an evidence of competitive entry, especially when 
competitors face difficulties in expanding their market penetration.  
What about the welfare implications of winback strategies? Under our 
assumptions (equal production costs for both the incumbent and the entrant   27  
and homogenous products), consumers welfare is enhanced at the lowest 
post-entry price. This brings some ambiguity in the results: when post-entry 
price is the same upon entry and at t=2 and at t=3 then  it is indifferent for 
the consumers if the entrant remains or not in the market. However, if post-
entry price equilibrium in the market, after the entrant has reached her 
critical threshold  k k = are lower than those associated with matching price 
equilibrium, then consumers welfare is enhanced with entry and with a ban 
on winback strategy. 
In the game structure outlined above, consumers welfare is ranked in the 
following way:  C
I
U W A M W W W W W ≤ < < < . Thus consumers welfare is inversely 
related to incumbent’s payoffs. In particular, consumers’ welfare under 
winback strategies is dominated by consumers’ welfare under price 
undercutting equilibrium and ex-post duopolistic competition. Let us now 
consider the welfare implications of a ban on winback strategies. 
 
Proposition 8. Consumers welfare under a ban on  winback strategies 
Given the game structure outlined above, a ban on winback strategy is 





With a ban on winback strategies there are only two possible outcomes in 
the game depicted in figure 5: price undercutting equilibrium or market 
sharing equilibrium. Given that  C
I
U W A M W W W W W ≤ < < < , independently on the 
conditions which induce one or the other equilibrium, consumers welfare is 
enhanced in any case. 
,   28  
Proposition 8 shows a remarkable result. Independently of the effective 
decision on k by the entrant, a ban on incumbent’s winback strategies (under 
the assumption of substantial entry costs) always enhances consumers 
welfare since in one case (price undercutting) immediate exit (or entry 
deterrence) by competitor is associated to a monopolistic configuration with 
lower prices with respect to pre-entry prices; in the other, ex-post prices 
bring to a duopolistic market equilibrium also characterized by lower prices 
with respect to pre-entry prices.  
What is important here to stress is that this result, and the consequent 
efficiency of a ban on incumbent’s winback strategies, is appreciable both by 
‘Chicagoan Skeptics’ (defending consumers welfare independently of the 
degree of competition in the market) and by ‘Post-Chicago Activists’ 
(defending consumers welfare through an increase in the degree of 
competition).   
However, as Armstrong and Vickers (1993) have outlined in a similar 
framework, a ban on selective price discrimination in the form of winback 
strategies, may induce too much entry in the market, i.e. inefficient 
competitors might be induced to enter the market, pushing the incumbent to 
accommodate at a price higher than that associated with efficient entry.  
Another important conclusion to outline here is that the same result here 
obtained applies in industries with consumers searching costs or with 
network effects  because also in those cases the entrant has to reach a 





Proposition 7 strictly depends on the assumptions we made on entrant’s 
behaviour. In particular, we have taken entry has granted and focused on 
post-entry competition.  
According to the assumptions made, entrants cannot anticipate at t=0 
incumbent post-entry decisions to block the entrants’ expansion towards the 
break-even value k or believe that incumbent will not or cannot influence,   29  
after  entry has occurred, entrants’ ability to expand own capacity, because 
winback actions are deemed to violate the antitrust law. It is for this reason 
that entry occurs and winback is adopted by the incumbent after having 
accommodated.  
We are aware this is an ad hoc assumption. In some respect, this assumption 
recalls the long-debated and criticized hypothesis of limit pricing models 
under which the prospective entrant was assumed to believe that the 
incumbent would have maintained the same behaviour after entry. In this 
section we try to clarify the motivations surrounding this ad hoc assumption. 
A first motivation relies on the idea that even if competitors know that 
winback strategies are possible (and legitimated under antitrust scrutiny) 
they may have favourable beliefs on the rate of winback: they could expect 
that the rate at which the put water on their bucket is higher than that at 
which water is poured out. One reason for that could be the incumbent’s 
inability to perfectly observe  k k =  or the penetration rate of new entrants, 
reacting thus with a lag to entrant’s expansion.  
Another motivation relies on entrant’s belief that the incumbent’s inability to 
perfectly observe  k k =  may induce a prudential attitude not to start a war 
price and to accommodate towards a duopolistic market sharing collusion. 
From corollary 2, we know that with uncertainty over the real value of 
k k = and on the entrant’s compared efficiency the incumbent may 
prudentially accommodate and signal his intent to move towards a 
duopolistic collusive equilibrium. 
Finally, an additional motivation to focus on post-entry strategy, regardless 
of entrant’s incentives to enter the market in the first instance, might be 
based on the idea that at least in some liberalized industries, incumbent’s 
price undercutting policies just after entry or winback strategies are deemed 
as an abuse or dominance. In this case it is the institutional framework that 
induces entry by competitor in the first instance. The next section compares 
the effect generated by winback with that produced by standard exclusionary 
strategies. 
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7. Comparing Winback and Standard Exclusionary 
Practices 
Winback strategies are just one of the possible exclusionary practices  that 
an incumbent may adopt in order to affect post-entry competition and 
blocking off entrant’s ability to expand her capacity towards the level  k k = . 
In this section we show the conditions under which standard exclusionary 
strategies produce the same effect of winback in the market.  
In particular we focus here on those strategies aimed at enforcing pre-
emption or retention of incumbent’s customers through13:  
(a) the adoption of legal/contractual rules such as exclusivity or breach 
penalty clauses upon customers;  
(b) the design of incentives to customers aimed at increasing the opportunity 
costs of switching towards competitors, through the assignment of rebates, 
discounts and price cuts which selectively retain ‘marginal customers’.  
These actions may produce, under certain conditions, horizontal foreclosure 
effects against competitors and, when coupled with selective discounts or 
price cuts, vertical discriminatory effects among different groups of 
incumbent’s customers. Even if the conditions under which the above 
practices are deemed to be anticompetitive may differ from one country to 
another (especially between US and EU14 antitrust policies), it is possible to 
define a minimum set of conditions according to which these practices have 






                                                 
13 We are not considering here below cost predatory pricing 
14 See Hovenkamp 1994; Facey et al 2003; Motta, 2005; Parcu, 2005.   31  
a. Pre-emptive Exclusivity Clauses 
When exclusivity clauses are signed between the incumbent and his clients, 
they can take the form of long-term exclusivity contracts including a penalty 
clause  p° for clients’ contractual breach and switch to competitors. That 
means that in order to replicate the incumbent price, the entrant has to 
decrease her price so as to repay the penalty to the switching customer 
(Brodley and Ma, 1993).  
In the case of total foreclosure, p° is set at a highly prohibitive level so that 
any efficient entry is actually inhibited. In other cases, efficient entry could be 
reduced (Aghion and Bolton, 1987). Any decrease in entrant’s price induced 
by the emergence of exit penalties implies an endogenous extension of the 
minimum capacity or market share necessary for the entrant to compete on 
an equal basis against the entrant.  
Under the framework outlined above, this means that with exclusivity 
clauses entrants payoffs are given by: 
 (9)    Π
E = (p
E − p°)k −h 
The penalty p° thus generates an endogenous extension of the minimum 
capacity or market penetration for the entrant (a raising rivals’ cost 
strategy), for given values of  h and 
E p as in (4): 








thus winback strategies appear to restrict competition more than exclusivity 
clause would do. Moreover, as  Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley (1991) have 
shown, in order to foreclose the market the incumbent need not to sign an 
exclusive deal with all customers but it is sufficient to block off a portion of 
customers just sufficient to inhibit the entrant’s ability to reach   k k = . Thus 
the blocking off penalty clause p°(k ) is given by that value that implies 
0 ) ( < ° Π p
E . They show that actual customers, being unable to coordinate 
their behaviour, would accept to be locked in such a contract.  
Aghion and Bolton (1987) show how customers may bargain exclusivity 
clause in exchange of a reduction in actual prices. The actual incumbent 
sacrifice, represented by applying a price 
I I p p < ~ , is rational whenever:   32  
(11)   ˜  p 






which always holds by definition. Again, the payoff associated to anti-
competitive breach penalties are comparable to those associated to winback 
strategies. 
Even if some remarkable differences exist between the competition policies 
adopted by US and EU antitrust authorities, network exclusivity clauses 
have been generally considered as an abuse of dominance when the effect 
produced on the market has been that of increasing efficient rivals’ costs to a 
level sufficient to deter entry or to induce exit.     
 
b.  Rebates, Price undercutting, Selective discounts, Most favoured 
customers clauses 
Another exclusionary strategy that the incumbent may adopt consists, rather 
than on imposing penalties on exit, on assigning appropriate incentives to 
induce customers retention through a policy of rebates (Greenlee, Reitman 
and Sibley, 2004).  
In the case of fidelity rebates, the incumbent assigns fidelity rebates as rewards 
or discounts to customers who purchase all or a specified portion of their 
requirements for a given product or service from a dominant firm. They may 
include also sales target-based over-rider discounts and so on. In the case of 
target rebates  the incumbent assigns rebates conditional on a company 
meeting a sales target that is higher than previous purchases. Both the types 
of discounts have been in some case deemed as anticompetitive when they 
seemed exclusively aimed at excluding competitors rather than at 
transferring efficiency improvements to customers (as in the case of quantity 
rebates).  
Whatever is the nature of incumbent’s rebates, formally they simply equal 
the effect of a price undercutting strategy with incumbent setting upon entry 
an effective discounted price 
E I p p = , which, according to the assumptions 
made in section 3, will block off entry or induce exit.  
As we have outlined above, in some cases, it is not necessary for the 
incumbent to adopt a price undercutting towards all the customers served. I 
might be sufficient to adopt a selective price undercutting towards the   33  
portion of customers actually contested by the entrant. This form of 
retention requires the incumbent havin g  a c c e s s  t o  i n f o r m a t i o n  o n  t h e  
identity of customers contested by an entrant.  
One way for the incumbent to enforce such a strategy without sustaining 
information costs is that of including in contracts the so-called ‘most 
favoured customer clause’ or ‘English clause’, often depicted as a de facto 
exclusivity (Lave, 2005), which implies that “the customer is allowed to 
switch suppliers without penalty if the dominant undertaking cannot or will 
not match more favourable terms offered by another supplier”. In this case, 
the incumbent applies a selective discount or price undercutting strategy just 





where k are the customers contested by the entrant . However when the 
incumbent has the information sufficient to match just the proportion of 
customers sufficient to block off the entrant, then we can have the same 
payoff of winback strategies Π
I = p
I(100− k − p
I)+ p
Eφ(k − k°).  
Again the strategy of selective price undercutting is rational for the 












which reproduces the same outcome we have shown for winback strategies. 
Such forms of rebates have been valued as anticompetitive, especially in 
Europe, when the existence of start up costs sustained by efficient entrants 
inhibited competitors’ ability to replicate price undercutting so as to induce 
the needed amount of customers to switch.  
In Europe selective price undercutting by an incumbent have been 
considered as anticompetitive because they produced discrimination against 
competitors and against customers (O’ Donoghue and Padilla, 2006). In the 
US the approach has been more prudential (Posner, 2004), pointing out the 
absence of substantial consumer harm, given that price undercutting, even 
when selective, generally enhances consumers welfare (Vickers, 2005; Rey 
and Tirole, 2007).  
Some US scholars, however, have repeatedly pointed out the anticompetitive 
nature of above-cost price undercutting (Edlin, 1997; 2002).  In order for 
these strategies to be exclusionary it must be that they increase rivals’ cost of 
entry. If that is not the case, because for instance the entrant can immediately   34  
replicate any discount or rebate, then it would be rational for the incumbent 
just to accommodate entry. Thus raising rivals’ costs strategy are held in an 
economic environment in which there is a clear competitive advantage held 
by the dominant firm and an asymmetry in the competitive capacity between 
the incumbent and the entrant.  
Whatever is the antitrust attitude towards the above strategies (Facey,  and 
Assaf, 2002), the point that we would raise here is that they produce the same 
anticompetitive effect of winback strategies, thus there seems not being any 
compelling reason not to treat winback strategies, as we have defined them 
above, in the same way in which we deal with standard exclusionary practices  
whose ultimate effect is that of generating inefficient exclusion (Salop, 2005).  
As a consequence, when a competition authority considers as an abuse of 
dominance incumbent’s strategies such as exclusivity clauses, fidelity or target 
rebates, selective price undercutting and so on, it should also include winback 
strategies in its warning list.  
 
8. Winback vs. Non Discriminatory Price Undercutting 
Strategies 
Proposition 8 has shown how, under the game structure assumed, a ban on 
winback strategy is welfare-enhancing for any value of the entrant’s capacity 
or market share k. However, given the structure of the game, a ban on 
winback strategy simply implies that the equilibrium in the post-entry game 
outlined in figure 5 will be one characterized by price undercutting, thus 
with inducement of competitor’s exit.  
From the consumers welfare point of view, a ban on winback certainly 
constitutes an improvement with respect to the equilibrium associated with  
winback strategies. However, it could also be interesting to compare the 
welfare consequences of price undercutting equilibrium with that associated 
with entry and duopolistic market sharing equilibrium. If we assume that the 
matching price selected by the incumbent 
E p is equal to the level associate to 
duopolistic market sharing equilibrium, consumers welfare will be exactly 
the same in the two cases.   35  
 However, since by assumption the entrant has to cover start up costs upon 
entry, it might be the case for the price matched by the incumbent to be 
higher than that, say 
E p ~ , fixed by duopolistic firms after the entrant has 
reached her crucial threshold k .  
When this is the case, in order to maximize consumers welfare a ban on 
winback strategies should be coupled with a ban on undercut pricing (since 
ban on winback is equivalent to a ban on discriminatory selective pricing a 
joint ban here simply implies forbidding any form of price rebates aimed at 
foreclosing the market). The following proposition examines the case for a 
joint ban on winback and on post-price undercutting. 
  
Proposition 9  
Let us assume that, once the entrant reaches a capacity like  k k = , the 
duopolistic equilibrium price on the market 
E p ~  is lower than that (
E p ) 
associated to post-entry matching price by the incumbent, with 
E E p p < ~ . 
Then the most efficient consumers welfare configuration requires both a ban 
on incumbent’s winback strategies a ban on  post-entry price undercutting. 
 
Proof. 
I t  i s  e a s y  t o  s e e  h o w ,  i n  t h e  g a m e  i n  f i g u r e  6 ,  w i t h   
E E p p < ~ ,  C
I
U W W < . 




U , by backward induction, with a ban on winback 
strategies the incumbent is induced to undercut upon entry. Thus in order to 
enforce an aggregate outcome like  C W  a ban on winback should be coupled 
with a ban on post-entry price undercutting.  
, 
 
However, when, as in the European antitrust tradition, competition 
authorities encourage entry so as to ensure a long-term mechanism of 
competition in the market even at the expenses of short-term benefits on   36  
customers, then a joint ban would probably be selected, independently of the 
differential between prices 
E E p p , ~ .  
On the other hand, when there is uncertainty on the price level associated 
with the duopolistic equilibrium15 the joint ban outlined by Proposition 9 
could be equally associated with a price level higher than that determined by 
price undercutting strategies. In that case a joint ban would reduce 
consumers welfare. Besides, it should be pointed out that some antitrust 
authorities are considering as anticompetitive ant form of selective price 
undercutting or matching because of their discriminatory and foreclosing 
nature (O’ Donoghue and Padilla, 2006).  
As a consequence they are inclined to judge as pro-competitive  discounts, 
rebates and price undercut which are destined to the whole set of customers.  
Under this respect it would be problematic to couple a ban on winback with a 
ban on price undercut. However, in Europe, there have been some antitrust 
cases in which price undercutting or matching even when non discriminatory 
among customers (and thus uniformly applied to all customers) have been 
nonetheless judged as anticompetitive  (O’ Donoghue and Padilla, 2006). 
Edlin (2002) proposes a theory based on the anticompetitive effect of price 




In this  paper, we have outlined the potential anti-competitive rationale for 
winback actions as strategies aimed at blocking off post-entry competitors 
expansion to the critical level which enable the entrant to compete on an 
equal basis against the incumbent.  
We have shown how with respect to standard entry deterrence strategies, 
which generally face problems of post-entry commitment and credible 
threats by incumbent, we show how blocking off competitors’ post-entry 
expansion could be, in some circumstances, a more profitable strategy in the 
incumbent’s interest, bringing to a higher degree of effectiveness.  
                                                 
15 Edlin (1997) surveys the literature on the anticompetitive effects of price matching, especially of selective 
discriminatory price matching, showing the ambiguous results associated with the price level of price 
matching which will depend on ad hoc assumptions.   37  
The example of winback strategies suggests that the adoption of an economic 
a p p r o a c h  m a y  h e l p  i n  d e t e c t i n g  a n  a b u s e  o f  d o m i n a n t  p o s i t i o n  b y  a n  
incumbent operator pursued throughout the so-called winback strategies in 
relevant markets characterized by entry costs. If from one side,  these 
strategies are clearly the result of competition to the benefits of customers, 
from the other, as some antitrust and regulatory authorities recently pointed 
out, they may generate substantial anticompetitive effects.  
We have argued that incumbent’s winback strategy is rational only when it is 
exclusionary. Under given conditions,  winback strategies might block off 
competitor’s expansion after entry, thus generating the same outcome raised 
by standard exclusionary practices. We have finally discussed the consumers 
welfare effects of a temporarily ban on incumbent’s winback against new 
entrants.   
However, the discussion on consumers welfare has outlined some of the 
persistent antitrust dilemmas such as the choice between short-term 
equilibria which improve actual consumers welfare to the detriment of actual 
competitors, and long-term competitive equilibria which sacrifice actual 
consumers welfare.  
These dilemmas seem to go beyond our, relying on the specific aims pursued 
by the competition policy authorities. 
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